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The Challenges of Institution 
Building
Prospects for the UN Peacebuilding  
Architecture
Thomas Biersteker and Oliver Jütersonke 
Preface  From the Project Director 
At the 2005 World Summit in New York City, member states of the 
United Nations agreed to create “a dedicated institutional mechanism 
to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict to-
wards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist them in 
laying the foundation for sustainable development”. That new mecha-
nism was the UN Peacebuilding Commission and two associated bod-
ies: a Peacebuilding Support Office and a Peacebuilding Fund. To-
gether, these new entities have been characterized as the UN’s new 
peacebuilding architecture, or PBA. 
 
This Working Paper is one of nine essays that examine the possible 
future role of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture. They were written 
as part of a project co-organized by the Centre for International Policy 
Studies at the University of Ottawa and the Norwegian Institute of  
International Affairs. All of the contributors to the project were asked 
to identify realistic but ambitious “stretch targets” for the Peacebuild-
ing Commission and its associated bodies over the next five to ten 
years. The resulting Working Papers, including this one, seek to 
stimulate fresh thinking about the UN’s role in peacebuilding.  
 
The moment is ripe for such rethinking: During 2010, the UN will re-
view the performance of the PBA to date, including the question of 
whether it has achieved its mandated objectives. Most of the contribu-
tors to this project believe that the PBA should pursue a more ambi-
tious agenda over the next five years. While the PBC and its associ-
ated bodies have succeeded in carving out a niche for themselves, that 
niche remains a small one. Yet the need for more focused international 
attention, expertise, and coordinated and sustained assistance towards 
war-torn countries is undiminished. It remains to be seen whether UN 
officials and the organization’s member states will rise to the chal-
lenge of delivering on the PBA’s initial promise over the next five 
years and beyond, but doing so will at least require a vision of what 
the PBA can potentially accomplish in this period. The Working  
Papers produced in this project are intended to provide grist for this 
visioning effort. 
 
Roland Paris 
Ottawa, January 2010 
Summary 
Different theories of international relations, institutions, and organiza-
tions have insights into both the constraints the new UN peacebuilding 
architecture is likely to face, as well as potential ways of overcoming 
some of them. Emphasising that the UN remains a state-centric orga-
nization marred by political frictions, political realists would focus on 
the importance of leadership, interestingly echoed in the June 2009 
Secretary-General’s report. Rational institutionalists tell us that issue 
linkage should be pursued in heterogeneous institutions, something 
the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) should explicitly try to foster. 
Public choice analysts would advise that one recognize, and try to 
work within, the structure of institutional interests, by developing in-
dicators of performance that are outcomes, rather than process-
oriented. Organization theorists highlight the limited repertoire of pos-
sible policy options and the means-driven nature of many decision-
making processes, calling for outside appraisals and deliberate efforts 
to break routines and engage in forms of broad-based self-reflection. 
Constructivists emphasize the importance and potential power of ideas 
in framing discourse and shaping debates, and would advise that the 
Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), the Working Group on Les-
sons Learned (WGLL), or some other entity might become locations 
for the generation of new ideas about peacebuilding. In the final 
analysis, the success of the UN peacebuilding architecture will not be 
determined by the number of countries requesting its institutions’ assi-
stance or the size of its operating budgets, but by the added value it 
provides. There is an extraordinary wealth of experience concerning 
the challenges of peacebuilding within the UN system, if it could only 
be mobilized in a systematic manner.1 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The United Nations peacebuilding architecture is a new and relatively 
recent institutional creation, composed of three interrelated entities: 
the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Support Of-
fice (PBSO), and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). Like all new institu-
                                                 
1  This Working Paper is based on a longer, more substantive chapter to be published in a 
forthcoming edited volume of the Future of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture project. 
The authors would like to thank Roland Paris, Richard Caplan, and the participants of the 
CIPS workshop at the University of Ottawa on 24 September 2009, for their comments 
and suggestions on an earlier version of the text. Thanks also go to Georg von Kalckreuth 
for research and editorial assistance, as well as to Cedric de Coning and NUPI for their 
work on this publication. 
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tions, it reflects the concerns, the issues, the interests, and the politics 
of its time.  
 
The UN’s involvement in peacebuilding did not begin with the estab-
lishment of the institutions that comprise the peacebuilding architec-
ture in 2005, but rather emerged in the context of its long experience 
with the complex and interconnected challenges of conflict resolution, 
peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding, recon-
ciliation and development. Unlike many UN bodies operating princi-
pally in one domain, the PBC and its supporting office is tasked with 
developing an integrated strategy involving politics, economics, and 
security, areas traditionally treated separately by different agencies or 
divisions of the UN. 
 
As a new institutional creation, the UN peacebuilding architecture has 
faced some predictable institutional challenges. There has been con-
testation over its membership, questions about its scope of authority, 
resistance to its attempts to coordinate the activities of already existing 
institutions, difficulties in organizing and staffing its operational acti-
vities, problems in establishing rules and operational procedures, and 
challenges in translating lessons learned from other countries. In 
thinking about what role (or roles) the UN peacebuilding architecture 
should perform ten years from now, it is important to consider what 
role it realistically could be expected to perform.  
 
Different theories of international relations, institutions, and organiza-
tions have insights into both the constraints new institutional entities 
are likely to face, as well as potential ways of overcoming some of 
them. To address the issue of what role the UN peacebuilding archi-
tecture could realistically be expected to perform ten years from now, 
we briefly examine what different theories have to tell us about the 
origins of new institutions, their operational dynamics, their chal-
lenges, their constraints, their pathologies, and their realistic possibili-
ties.  
 
 
 
What would political realists say? 
The United Nations was created out of the very specific circumstances 
at the end of the Second World War, circumstances that have long 
since changed quite significantly. Political realism, which posits the 
existence of self-interested actors in a self-help system with no over-
arching authority, would emphasize these circumstances, and would 
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view the prospects of the UN peacebuilding architecture to be a direct 
function of them. 
 
Major Powers use the UN to pursue their sometimes very narrow for-
eign policy interests. The UN remains a profoundly state-centered  
organization divided by political frictions not only between the Secur-
ity Council and the General Assembly, but also more generally  
between states of the North and the South. These structural constraints 
are not about to go away, and the peacebuilding architecture will be 
forced to operate within them for the foreseeable future. 
 
What is more malleable and offers promise of change in the next ten 
years is the quality of the leadership of the new UN peacebuilding  
architecture. While new technologies and information platforms have 
the potential to generate more rapid, inclusive, and effective ap-
proaches to “collective” peacebuilding efforts, revising bureaucratic 
approaches to priority-setting, planning, and monitoring – arguably 
the crux of the current dilemmas facing the PBC and PBSO – will re-
quire innovative leadership, both in the UN Secretariat and in key po-
sitions in the government administrations of Member States.  
 
Already in 1948, when discussing the functions of the General  
Assembly, Hans Morgenthau, for many a “founding father” of the re-
alist school in international politics, was quick to point out that 
“[w]here there is no opportunity for constructive action, talent cannot 
prove itself and responsibility declines.”2 The rule-bound nature of 
bureaucracies breeds not Morgenthau’s “talented statesman,” but 
rather narrowed professionals seeking secure careers within the sys-
tem, people who may well be “lacking in heroism, human spontaneity, 
and inventiveness.”3 Morgenthau would thus have welcomed the call 
for an increase in leadership capacity that was repeatedly expressed in 
the June 2009 Secretary-General’s report.4 
 
 
 
                                                 
2  H. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New 
York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), 380. 
3  M. N. Barnett and M. Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International 
Organizations”, International Organization, 53 (1999), 699-732, at 709. 
4  UN Secretary-General’s Report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, 
11 June 2009, 9-13, 26. 
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What would rational institutionalists 
say? 
Rational institutionalists agree with political realists that “states use 
international institutions to further their own goals, and they design 
institutions accordingly.”5 But they challenge realist arguments that 
tend to see international institutions primarily as vehicles for the ex-
pression of state power, and constructivist views (considered below) 
that see international institutions as exogenous actors with independ-
ent agency that often play a critical role in the spread of norms. 
Rather, they contend that the design of different international institu-
tions is “the result of rational, purposive interactions among states and 
other international actors to solve specific problems.”6  
 
Some of the institutional constraints identified by rational institution-
alists are largely fixed and likely to remain relatively fixed over the 
short to medium term. The size of the body is unlikely to change, and 
it is likely to be slow to adapt its recently adopted rules of member-
ship, terms, and procedures. This has important implications for its 
decision-making rules and the range and scope of its operations, as 
well as for its institutional flexibility. These constraints are not about 
to dissipate, and the peacebuilding architecture will be forced to oper-
ate within them for the foreseeable future. 
 
What is more malleable in the next ten years is the prospect of using 
issue linkage and trade-offs among actors with different interests to 
create opportunities for resolving conflicts and reaching mutually be-
neficial arrangements. While the size of an institution increases its he-
terogeneity and reduces its ability to reach agreement, size also en-
ables conditions under which issue linkage among actors with hetero-
geneous interests “may generate new opportunities for resolving con-
flicts and reaching mutually beneficial arrangements.”7  
 
 
 
                                                 
5  B. Koremenos, C. Lispon and D. Snidal, “The Rational Design of Institutions”, Interna-
tional Organization, 55 (2001), 761-99, at 762. 
6  Ibid. 
7  Ibid., 785-6. 
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What would public choice theorists 
say? 
Public choice theorists take issue with the idea that international orga-
nizations exist to promote a general public interest; instead, they view 
them fundamentally as bureaucracies.8 As such, they are populated by 
unelected and overpaid international civil servants who are not pub-
licly accountable and are highly susceptible to interest group pressure.  
 
International organizations, like all organizations, are interested first 
and foremost in their survival. One of the best ways to ensure institu-
tional survival is to expand, often by taking on new tasks. All bureau-
cracies try to maximize their power in terms of budget size, staff size, 
building space, and freedom of action. These tendencies are even 
more pronounced in international organizations than they are in  
national ones.  
 
UN peacebuilding efforts predated the founding of the UN peace-
building architecture, even though they were distributed across a large 
number of different institutions (with different founding missions and 
institutional mandates). Thus, its new institutions – the PBC, the 
PBSO, and the PBF – have encountered suspicion, quiet institutional 
sabotage, and occasionally outright opposition from their predeces-
sors, the very institutions they are expected to coordinate.  
 
Everyone is in favour of coordination in the abstract, but very few  
appreciate being coordinated – particularly if it has implications for 
their expansion, development, or survival as an institution. Many ex-
isting agencies are more interested in protecting their turf than being 
coordinated by a well-intentioned new player with limited or untested 
political backing. This has proven to be a particularly acute challenge 
for the PBSO, mainly due to a lack of political resources and clout to 
do much more. It not only has implications for the countries with 
which the PBC chooses to work, but also for the probability for per-
ceptions of its long term success or failure as an institution. 
 
Because much of the work of the new peacebuilding architecture is 
supply-determined, and because all organizations are interested in 
their survival and expansion, we should not expect the PBC and PBSO 
to be exempt from the core tendencies identified by theories of public 
choice. We should also not be surprised that their creation has pro-
                                                 
8  R. Vaubel, “International Organization”, in C. Rowley and F. Schneider (eds.), Encyclo-
pedia of Public Choice (New York, NY and Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
2004), 319-20. 
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duced such predictable, if sometimes discouraging, responses from 
other UN institutions and agencies. These institutional constraints and 
tendencies are normal, but need not be entirely determining. For ex-
ample, if the criteria for the evaluation of the success of the peace-
building architecture are performance and outcomes-oriented, rather 
than based on intermediate, operational indicators – such as growth in 
personal, number of countries added to the PBC roster, or annual 
budget expenditures – some of the institutional pathologies identified 
by public choice theorists can be mitigated. 
 
 
 
What would organization theorists 
say? 
A cybernetic approach to organizations would assert that the goals of 
establishing the UN peacebuilding architecture were hazily defined 
and that outcomes are consequently uncertain. Contrary to the claims 
of theories of public choice and rational institutions, decision-makers 
do not construct maximizing policies, but instead assemble policies 
that “suffice” from a repertoire of existing policies, processes, and  
legal perspectives. 
 
Cybernetic organization theorists contend that means-ends analysis is 
often limited or unfeasible,9 and we might be faced with the situation 
in which policy-making may be driven more by available solutions 
than by existing problems.10 Arguably, the new emphasis within the 
UN on the peacebuilding architecture, and the subsequent institutional 
creation of the PBC, PBSO and PBF, can be explained with reference 
to the way decision-makers were attempting to “muddle through” us-
ing the limited repertoire of policy options at their disposal. A focus 
on peacebuilding was simultaneously the means through which to  
generate greater coordination, and the end in itself, namely an inte-
grated approach to post-conflict situations and fragile states. 
 
Over the past decade, the UN has increasingly been faced with calls to 
reform its institutional set-up in such a way as to increase coordination 
and policy coherence in an environment in which individual Members 
States voiced considerable concern over the way their financial con-
                                                 
9  C. E. Lindblom, “The Science of ‘Muddling Through’”, Public Administration Review, 19 
(1959), 79-88. 
10  M. Cohen, J. March and J. Olson, “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice”, in 
J. March (ed.), Decisions and Organizations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 294-334; J. 
March and J. Olson, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics 
(New York, NY: The Free Press, 1989). 
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tributions were being spent. Everyone agreed that “something had to 
be done,” but there was far less clarity over what could be possible 
given the limited repertoire of “problem-response” elements at the 
disposal of policy-makers. From an organizational point of view, the 
introduction of the language of peacebuilding cannot be explained as 
the product of rational action based on a number of key variables that 
generate predictable outcomes. The creation of the new peacebuilding 
architecture was arguably not a rational or deliberate decision. Rather, 
it was a product of the decision-making arena and limited repertoire of 
responses from which it emerged from principal actors at the time. 
 
Organization theorists would posit that the UN’s approach to peace-
building will be determined more by tendencies to simplify assump-
tions about the complexity of peacebuilding, pre-existing institutional 
routines, and existing policy instruments, than by a fresh re-thinking 
of institutional practices and a fundamental reconsideration of ways to 
address the challenges of peacebuilding. Coordinating so many di-
verse actors – especially those not traditionally accustomed to work-
ing closely in collaboration with UN agencies – will be a particularly 
difficult challenge. One way to ameliorate these tendencies would be 
to invite outside appraisals of the performance of the new peacebuild-
ing architecture of the sort being undertaken by the project that stimu-
lated this paper. Another would be to institutionalize periodic retreats 
where policy practitioners and outside analysts meet to reflect can-
didly not only on best practices, but also on worst practices, in a con-
structive attempt to learn from the initial experiences with peacebuild-
ing in Burundi and Sierra Leone. 
 
 
 
What would social constructivists 
say? 
Social constructivism is based on a fundamental insight concerning 
the constitution of knowledge that has long been part-and-parcel of 
linguistics and pedagogy. This is the view that meaning assigned to 
labels is a product of language and experience, and that the production 
of knowledge is a socially and historically contingent discursive pro-
cess of accommodation and assimilation.11 In the study of interna-
tional politics, this amounts to the assertion that shared ideas cannot 
be separated from material forces, that they matter just as much, and 
that the interests and goals of purposive actors do not constitute a pre-
                                                 
11  Cf. P. L. Berger and T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the 
Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967). 
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determined belief and preference system, but are continuously shaped 
by these ideas themselves. 
 
International organizations engage in categorizing information and 
knowledge, fixing meanings of concepts, and articulating and diffus-
ing norms – a process that ultimately generates both autonomy and 
authority. The flip-side of such power, however, is the propensity for a 
variety of dysfunctional institutional behaviour that may well result in 
ingrained and permanent pathologies, ranging from organizational in-
sulation and universalizing blueprints to incommensurable institu-
tional cultures and the normalization of deviance.12 
 
Calls for a new UN peacebuilding architecture stemmed from growing 
unease, expressed by both Member States and functionaries at the UN, 
over an obvious lack of coordination among the 30+ agencies, funds, 
and programmes that the UN deploys in the field, making up the stag-
gering total of over 90,000 military and civilian personnel in 2006.13 
The solution was perceived to lie in a new bureaucratic machinery that 
would not only go on to classify all these actors and activities as 
working towards a common cause (“peacebuilding”), but would sub-
sequently shift the focus of the term “peacebuilding” to the “immedi-
ate aftermath of conflict”, (i.e. in “the first two years after the main 
conflict has ended”), thereby helping to articulate and diffuse the 
norm that this narrow conceptualization of peacebuilding constituted.  
It is a tribute to the autonomy of the United Nations (but arguably also 
testimony to its organizational insulation) that it can impose a termi-
nology that is not employed by the majority of government admini-
strations of Member States. Having indirectly “authorized” the crea-
tion of the new peacebuilding architecture, Member States are now 
playing catch-up to an organizational logic that self-perpetuates ac-
cording to internal mechanisms of bureaucratic universalization: each 
and every actor and activity that is linked to a post-conflict setting is 
now classified as being part of, or in an as yet to be defined relation-
ship with, the goal of peacebuilding.  
 
Operational blueprints and “one-size-fits-all” solutions may be discur-
sively shunned, yet entities such as the PBC’s Working Group on Les-
sons Learned (WGLL) are searching for the common ground in “gen-
eral principles” for effective peacebuilding, including the promotion 
of national ownership, the provision of sustained engagement, and the 
fostering of mutual accountability. These principles, stakeholders are 
                                                 
12  M. N. Barnett and M. Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International 
Organizations”, International Organization, 53 (1999), 699-732; Barnett and Finnemore 
would go on to expand the article into a book, Rules for the World: International Organi-
zations in World Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). 
13  R. Ponzio, “The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: Origins and Initial Practice”, 
Disarmament Forum, 2 (2007), 5-15, at 6. 
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being told, have to be adapted to “country-specific realities.”14 Bear-
ing the potential for dysfunctional behavior in mind, the Working 
Group would do well to recognize that the blueprint they are attempt-
ing to avoid can be ideational as much as operational. But herein, the 
social constructivist might argue, also lies an opportunity, for “effec-
tive peacebuilding” is as much about sharing a common set of ideas 
and a common vocabulary, as it is about deploying material resources 
to those who need them most. 
 
 
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
While it is easy to identify deficiencies or even pathologies in all insti-
tutions, there are some institutional aspects of the UN peacebuilding 
architecture that cannot feasibly be changed, no matter what their  
desirability. The PBC, PBSO, and PBF are institutional creations of 
the United Nations. They will invariably reflect the structural con-
straints and political challenges that exist throughout the organization 
– the ongoing North/South confrontation, the organization’s growing 
democratic deficit, its state-centrism, and its use by powerful states to 
pursue their narrow foreign policy interests. The peacebuilding archi-
tecture is a joint creation of both the UN General Assembly and the 
UN Security Council, and it will invariably continue to be caught up 
in the politics of and between both of them. Its relevance and salience 
will be dependent on its degree of political support from states and 
international organizations that have the most clout in these issue do-
mains.  
 
Given the political context of its origins, the PBC is not likely to be 
reduced in size, and will therefore face challenges of issue scope, con-
sensus decision-making, and limited flexibility. Both the PBC and the 
PBSO are bureaucracies and therefore will operate like bureaucracies 
everywhere, with their rivalries, struggles for power, and core interests 
in their own survival. The actors they are called upon to coordinate, 
and the policy instruments they bring to the table will be determined 
more by satisficing than by original approaches to the challenges of 
peacebuilding. Finally, the fixing of meanings has already evidenced 
some institutional pathologies in the UN peacebuilding architecture, 
and the concept of peacebuilding itself continues to paper over some 
unarticulated contradictions. 
 
                                                 
14  See the Synthesis Report of the Special Session of the Working Group on Lessons Lear-
ned, 12 June 2008, entitled “Key Insights, Principles, Good Practices and Emerging Les-
sons in Peacebuilding”. 
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Morgenthau’s realist emphasis on the importance of leadership, inter-
estingly echoed in one of the Secretary-General’s most recent reports, 
suggests that the director of the PBSO should be an institutional en-
trepreneur. An institutional entrepreneur within the UN is someone 
who knows the inner workings of the organization well, but has also 
demonstrated a capacity to get things accomplished (both within the 
existing institutional structure and by mobilizing resources from 
Member States and organizations outside of the UN).15 Rational insti-
tutionalists tell us that issue linkage should be pursued in heterogene-
ous institutions, something the PBC should explicitly try to foster. 
Public choice analysts would advise that one recognize, and try to 
work within, the structure of institutional interests, by developing in-
dicators of performance that are outcomes, rather than process-
oriented. Organization theorists highlight the limited repertoire of pos-
sible policy options and the means-driven nature of many decision-
making processes, calling for outside appraisals and deliberate efforts 
to break routines and engage in forms of broad-based self-reflection. 
Constructivists emphasize the importance and potential power of ideas 
in framing discourse and shaping debates, and would advise that the 
PBSO, the WGLL, or some other entity might become locations for 
the generation of new ideas about peacebuilding. There is an extraor-
dinary wealth of experience concerning the challenges of peacebuild-
ing within the UN system, if it could only be mobilized in a systematic 
manner. Building alliances with existing research networks, possibly 
sub-contracting research to them on priority subjects, would be more 
efficient than trying to create a full-scale research operation within the 
PBSO. It might also facilitate the generation of additional resources. 
 
In the final analysis, the success of the UN peacebuilding architecture 
will not be determined by the number of countries requesting its insti-
tutions’ assistance or the size of its operating budgets, but by the  
value-added it provides. Thinking counterfactually, the UN peace-
building architecture could be considered as a success in ten years if it 
becomes clear that there are some things that reasonably would not 
have taken place without it. The performance of the UN peacebuilding 
architecture should be evaluated by the amount of resources mobilized 
for countries seeking its assistance, compared systematically with 
countries not on the PBC’s agenda at a comparable or similar stage of 
its transition from conflict to sustainable peace. Similar comparative 
assessments of PBC and non-PBC countries should be undertaken,  
examining the amount of bureaucratic attention given to focus coun-
tries by major powers (including regional powers), whether continued 
media coverage is given to them by the global media, their ability to 
                                                 
15  Both the PBC and the PBSO were fortunate during 2009 to have been led by highly capa-
ble individuals (Heraldo Munoz and Judy Cheng-Hopkins). As long as they are given ade-
quate political backing, this bodes well for the future of the enterprise. 
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engage international financial institutions and major non-
governmental actors, and the extent to which peacebuilding pro-
grammes begin to address some of the root causes of violence and in-
security 
 
There are already a few anecdotal examples that the UN peacebuilding 
architecture has delivered some things that probably would not have 
taken place without it. It has facilitated the release of previously fro-
zen World Bank funds for one country, and it has ensured the in-
creased interest of the chairs of the country-specific meetings in the 
design of programmes and adequacy of resources for target countries 
under their mandate. Whether these steps merit being considered a 
real success, however, needs to be tempered by the amount of re-
sources already invested in this new institutional arrangement. 
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